Sense and Sensitivity Analysis: Simple Post-Hoc Analysis of Bias Due to
  Unobserved Confounding by Veitch, Victor & Zaveri, Anisha
Sense and Sensitivity Analysis: Simple Post-Hoc
Analysis of Bias Due to Unobserved Confounding
Victor Veitch1 and Anisha Zaveri2
1Columbia University
2Weill Cornell Medicine
Abstract
It is a truth universally acknowledged that an observed association without known
mechanism must be in want of a causal estimate. However, causal estimation from
observational data often relies on the (untestable) assumption of ‘no unobserved con-
founding’. Violations of this assumption can induce bias in effect estimates. In principle,
such bias could invalidate or reverse the conclusions of a study. However, in some
cases, we might hope that the influence of unobserved confounders is weak relative to a
‘large’ estimated effect, so the qualitative conclusions are robust to bias from unobserved
confounding. The purpose of this paper is to develop Austen plots, a sensitivity analysis
tool to aid such judgments by making it easier to reason about potential bias induced by
unobserved confounding. We formalize confounding strength in terms of how strongly
the confounder influences treatment assignment and outcome. For a target level of
bias, an Austen plot shows the minimum values of treatment and outcome influence
required to induce that level of bias. Domain experts can then make subjective judgments
about whether such strong confounders are plausible. To aid this judgment, the Austen
plot additionally displays the estimated influence strength of (groups of) the observed
covariates. Austen plots generalize the classic sensitivity analysis approach of Imbens
[Imb03]. Critically, Austen plots allow any approach for modeling the observed data
and producing the initial estimate. We illustrate the tool by assessing biases for several
real causal inference problems, using a variety of machine learning approaches for the
initial data analysis. Code is available at github.com/anishazaveri/austen_plots.
1 Introduction
The high costs of randomized controlled trials coupled with the relative availability of (large
scale) observational data motivate attempts to infer causal relationships from observational
data. For example, we might want to use electronic health record data to infer the expected
outcome of intervening by assigning a particular treatment to a new patient. Causal inference
from observational data must account for possible confounders that influence both treatment
assignment and the outcome; e.g., wealth may be a common cause influencing whether a
patient takes an expensive drug and whether they recover. Often, causal inference is based
on the assumption of ‘no unobserved confounding’; i.e., the assumption that the observed
covariates include all common causes of the treatment assignment and outcome. This
assumption is fundamentally untestable from observed data, but its violation can induce
bias in the estimation of the treatment effect—the unobserved confounding may completely
or in part explain the observed association. Our aim here is to develop a sensitivity analysis
tool to aid in reasoning about potential bias induced by unobserved confounding.
Intuitively, if we estimate a large positive effect then we might expect the real effect is also
positive, even in the presence of mild unobserved confounding. This is extremely useful
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because it allows us to use observational data even in cases where we cannot strictly rule
out all unobserved confounding. For example, consider the association between smoking
and lung cancer. One could argue that this association arises from a genetic mutation that
predisposes carriers to both an increased desire to smoke and to a greater risk of lung cancer.
However, the association between smoking and lung cancer is large—is it plausible that
some unknown genetic association could have a strong enough influence to explain the
association? Answering such questions requires a domain expert to make a judgment about
whether the confounding is “mild” relative to the “large” effect. In particular, the domain
expert must translate judgments about the strength of the unobserved confounding into
judgments about the bias induced in the estimate of the effect. The aim of sensitivity analysis
is to formalize what is meant by the strength of unobserved confounding, and to show how
to translate judgments about confounding strength into judgments about bias.
A prototypical example, due to Imbens [Imb03] (building on [RR83a]), illustrates the broad
approach. The observed data consists of a treatment T (the patient took a blood pressure
medication), an outcome Y (their blood pressure), and covariates X that may causally affect
the treatment and outcome (socioeconomic status, age, baseline health measurements, etc.).
We then posit an additional unobserved binary confounder U for each patient; e.g., a gene
that affects both blood pressure and conscientiousness. Next, we suppose that the observed
data and unobserved confounder were generated according to the following generative
model:
Ui
iid∼ Bern(1/2) (1.1)
Ti | X i , Ui ind∼ Bern(sig(γX i +αUi))
Yi | X i , Ti , Ui ind∼ Normal(τTi + βX i +δUi ,σ2).
where sig = exp(·)/(1 + exp(·)) is the sigmoid function. If Ui had been observed, we
could estimate (τˆ, γˆ, βˆ , αˆ, δˆ, σˆ2) from the data by maximum likelihood estimation, and
report τˆ as the estimate of the average treatment effect. Since Ui is not observed, it is not
possible to identify the parameters from the data. Instead, we make (subjective) judgments
about plausible values of α—how strongly Ui affects the treatment assignment—and δ—
how strongly Ui affects the outcome. Contingent on plausible α = α∗ and δ = δ∗, the
other parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood. This yields an estimate of the
treatment effect τˆ(α∗,δ∗) under the presumed values of the sensitivity parameters.
This procedure was substantially improved by Imbens [Imb03] through two innovations.
First, he re-parameterized the model so that the sensitivity parameters are the partial
coefficients of determination for Ui instead of the raw regression coefficients. This introduces
a standardized scale for the strength of influence, and facilitates comparison with observed
covariates where the strength of influence can be measured from data. Second, he plotted
the curve of all values of the sensitivity parameter that would yield given level of bias. This
moves the analyst judgment from “what are plausible values of the sensitivity parameters?”
to “are sensitivity parameters this extreme plausible?” We will adapt both innovations
below.
The approach just outlined has a major drawback: it is completely reliant on the simple
parametric specification (1.1). The assumed model is equivalent to assuming that, had U
been observed, it would have been appropriate to use logistic regression to model treatment
assignment, and linear regression to model the outcome. This assumption also implies a
simple, parametric model for the relationships governing the observed data. This is out
of step with modern practice, where we use flexible machine-learning methods to model
these relationships. For example, the assumption forbids the use of neural networks or
random forests, though such methods are often state-of-the-art for causal effect estimation
[e.g., Dor+19; HB19; AI19]. In fact, the problem is worse still. Franks et al. [Fra+19]
demonstrate that changing the assumed values of α∗ and δ∗ also changes how well the
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Figure 1: Austen plot showing how strong an unobserved confounder would need to be to induce a
bias of 2 in an observational study of the effect of combination blood pressure medications on diastolic
blood pressure [Dor+16]. We chose this bias to equal the nominal average treatment effect estimated
from the data. We model the outcome with Bayesian Additive Regression Trees and the treatment
assignment with logistic regression—Austen plots accommodate any choice of models. The curve shows
all values treatment and outcome influence that would induce a bias of 2. The colored dots show
the influence strength of (groups of) observed covariates, given all other covariates. For example, an
unobserved confounder with as much influence as the patient’s age might induce a bias of about 2.
assumed model fits the observed data. However, the point of sensitivity analysis is to aid
us in domain-specific judgments about an assumption that is not testable from data. The
approach lumps together poor model fit and unobserved confounding. In this sense, the
fully-parametric cure may be worse than the unobserved-confounding disease.
There are a number of approaches that sidestep the parametric specification problem [e.g.,
Fra+19; She+11; VA11; DV15]. However, these methods require subjective judgments
about sensitivity parameters that are more abstract than the ones used in Imbens’ approach.
See section 5 for a more detailed discussion. For example, Franks et al. [Fra+19] requires
the analyst to make subjective judgments about posterior probability of treatment given
the counterfactual outcomes. Such judgments may be possible and natural in some circum-
stances, but in many circumstances we’d prefer to make judgments on the more directly
interpretable confounding strength parameters of the parametric approach (1.1).
Austen plots The purpose of this paper is to introduce Austen plots, an adaptation of
Imbens’ approach that fully decouples sensitivity analysis and modeling of the observed
data. An example Austen plot is shown in Figure 1. The key elements of Imbens’ approach
are preserved. Plausibility judgments are made (i) post-hoc, (ii) on directly interpretable
quantities—how much the confounder influences Y and T , and (iii) on a standardized scale
that facilitates comparison to the influence strength of (groups of) observed covariates.
Moreover, because the model underlying the Austen plot has no implications for the ob-
served data, the data analysis may use absolutely any modeling approach, including any
combination of machine-learning methods. Austen plots can then be constructed post-hoc
to aid in reasoning about the potential impact of unobserved confounding.
Austen plots measure the confounder influence on the outcome as the partial R2 of the con-
founder given the observed covariates. The confounder influence on treatment assignment
is measured as
α= E[P(T = 1 | U , x) | T = 1]−E[P(T = 1 | U , x) | T = 0]. (1.2)
That is, α is the change in our belief about how likely a unit was to have gotten the treatment,
given that they were actually observed to be treated (or not). If an unobserved confounder
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strongly affects treatment assignment (with large u implying high probability of treatment),
then actually seeing somebody treated suggests a high value of u, which in turn suggests
they were likely to have been treated. Austen plots rely on a model of confounder influence
to calculate bias from the confounder influence. This model, a simple generalization of
Imbens’ approach, is discussed below.
Figure 1, an Austen plot for an observational study of the effect of combination medications
on diastolic blood pressure, illustrates the idea. A bias of 2 would suffice to undermine the
qualitative conclusion that the blood-pressure treatment is effective. Examining the plot, an
unobserved confounder as strong as age could induce this amount of confounding, but no
other (group of) observed confounders has so much influence. Accordingly, if a domain
expert thinks an unobserved confounder as strong as age is unlikely then they will think the
treatment is likely effective. Or, if such a confounder is plausible, they will think the study
fails to establish efficacy.
Notation For concreteness, we consider the estimation of the average effect of a binary
treatment. The data are generated independently and identically (Yi , Ti , X i , Ui)
iid∼ P, where
Ui is not observed and P is some unknown probability distribution. The average treatment
affect (ATE) is
ATE= E[Y | do(T = 1)]−E[Y | do(T = 0)].
The use of Pearl’s do notation indicates that the effect of interest is causal.
The traditional approach to causal estimation assumes that the observed covariates X contain
all common causes of Y and T . If this ‘no unobserved confounding’ assumption holds, then
the ATE is equal to parameter, τ, of the observed data distribution, where
τ= E[E[Y | X , T = 1]−E[Y | X , T = 0]]. (1.3)
The parameter τ can be estimated from a finite data sample. The general approach proceeds
in two steps. First, we produce estimates gˆ and Qˆ for the propensity score g and the
conditional expected outcome Q, where
Definition 1.1. The propensity score g is g(x) = P(T = 1 | X = x) and the conditional
expected outcome Q is Q(t, x) = E[Y | T = t, X = x].
In modern practice, Q and g are often estimated by fitting flexible machine learning models.
The second step is to plug the estimated Qˆ and gˆ in to some downstream estimator τˆ. For
example, following 1.3, the estimator
τˆQ =
1
n
∑
i
Qˆ(1, x i)− Qˆ(0, x i),
is a natural choice. Other estimators incorporate gˆ.
We are interested in the case of possible unobserved confounding. That is, where U causally
affects Y and T . If there is unobserved confounding then the parameter τ is not equal to
the ATE, so τˆ is a biased estimate. Inference about the ATE then divides into two tasks.
First, the statistical task: estimating τ as accurately as possible from the observed data.
And, second, the causal (domain-specific) problem of assessing bias=ATE−τ. Our aim
is to reason about the bias induced by unobserved confounding—the second task—in a
way that imposes no constraints on the modeling choices for Qˆ, gˆ and τˆ used in the initial
analysis.
2 Sensitivity Model
Our sensitivity analysis should impose no constraints on how the observed data is modeled.
However, sensitivity analysis demands some assumption on the relationship between the
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observed data and the unobserved confounder. It is convenient to formalize such assump-
tions by specifying a probabilistic model for how the data is generated. The strength of
confounding is then formalized in terms of the parameters of the model (the sensitivity
parameters). Then, the bias induced by the confounding can be derived from the assumed
model. Our task is to posit a generative model that both yields a useful and easily inter-
pretable sensitivity analysis, and that avoids imposing any assumptions about the observed
data.
To begin, consider the functional form of the sensitivity model used by Imbens [Imb03] (cf.
(1.1)).
logit P(T = 1 | x , u) = h(x) +αu (2.1)
E[Y | t, x , u] = l(t, x) +δu, (2.2)
for some functions h and l. That is, the propensity score is logit-linear in the unobserved
confounder, and the conditional expected outcome is linear. In principle, we could ac-
complish our task by finding a choice of h, l and distribution P(U ∈ ·) so that the implied
marginal distribution on the observed data agrees with the actual distribution of the observed
data.
The first key insight is that, by re-arranging (2.1) to solve for u and plugging in to (2.2), we
see that the following functional form is an equivalent assumption:
logit P(T = 1 | x , u) = h(x) +αu
E[Y | t, x , u] = l(t, x) +δ logit P(T = 1 | x , u).
The important observation is that the unobserved confounder u only influences the data
distribution through the propensity score. This means that we can circumvent the need to
explicitly articulate the distribution of U and the function h by directly positing a distribution
on P(T = 1 | x , u). This idea—treating the propensity score as a first-class citizen for
sensitivity analysis—is the key to the analysis.
Definition 2.1. Let g˜(x , u) = P(T = 1 | x , u) denote the propensity score given observed
covariates x and the unobserved confounder u.
The insight is that we can posit a sensitivity model by defining a distribution on g˜ directly.
Our choice is:1
g˜(X , U) | X ∼ Beta(g(X )(1/α−1), (1−g(X ))(1/α−1)).
The sensitivity parameter α controls the influence of the unobserved confounder U on
treatment assignment. When α is close to 0 then g˜(X , U) | X is tightly concentrated around
g(X ), and the unobserved confounder has little influence. That is, U minimally affects our
belief about who is likely to receive treatment. Conversely, when α is close to 1 then g˜
concentrates near 0 and 1; i.e., knowing U would let us predict treatment assignment with
near certainty.
With the g˜ model in hand, we define our sensitivity model:
Assumption 1 (Sensitivity Model).
g˜(X , U) | X ∼ Beta(g(X )(1/α−1), (1−g(X ))(1/α−1))
T | X , U ∼ Bern( g˜(X , U))
E[Y | T, X , U] = Q(T, X ) +δ  logit g˜(X , U)−E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T].
1the peculiar Beta parameterization is so that α has the simple interpretation given in (1.2).
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This model has been constructed to satisfy the requirement that the propensity score and
conditional expected outcome are the g and Q actually present in the observed data:
P(T = 1 | X ) = E[E[T | X , U] | X ] = E[ g˜(X , U) | X ] = g(X )
E[Y | T, X ] = E[E[Y | T, X , U] | T, X ] = Q(T, X ).
The sensitivity parameters are α, controlling the dependence between the unobserved
confounder the treatment assignment, and δ, controlling the relationship with the outcome.
In effect, by making an assumption about the propensity score directly we have sidestepped
the need to explicitly articulate the parts of the observed/unobserved relationship that
are not actually relevant for the treatment effect estimation. This lets us respect the no-
observable-implications desiderata while also maintaining a simple sensitivity model and
easily interpretable sensitivity parameters.
Remark 2.2. We motivated the form of our sensitivity model by analogy to Imbens’ model.
A more general, but more complicated, derivation proceeds as follows. The propensity
score carries all information in (X , U) that is relevant for causal identification [RR83b].
Accordingly, without loss of generality, the unobserved confounding bias may be assumed
to be induced according to E[Y | X , T, U] = Q(T, X ) + f (logit( g˜))− E[ f (logit( g˜)) | X , T]
for some function f . Our assumed model is equivalent to a first-order approximation of the
general model in logit( g˜/g). If α is small (and f is smooth with bounded second derivatives)
then it is possible to show the results that follow are approximately correct even for the
fully general outcome model. However, for simplicity, we do not pursue this further.
Bias We now turn to calculating the bias in the estimate implied by a given choice of
sensitivity parameters. By assumption, X and U together suffice to render the average
treatment effect identifiable as:
ATE= E[E[Y | 1, X , U]−E[Y | 0, X , U]].
Plugging in our sensitivity model yields,
ATE= E[Q(1, X )−Q(0, X )]+δ(E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T = 1]−E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T = 0]).
The first term is the observed-data estimate τ, so
bias= δ(E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T = 1]−E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T = 0]).
Then, by invoking Beta-Bernoulli conjugacy and standard Beta identities, we arrive at,
Theorem 2.3. Under our sensitivity model, Assumption 1, an unobserved confounder with
influence α and δ induces bias in the estimated treatment effect equal to
bias= δE

ψ
 
g(X )(1/α− 1) + 1−ψ (1− g(X ))(1/α− 1)
−ψ g(X )(1/α− 1)+ψ (1− g(X ))(1/α− 1) + 1,
where ψ is the digamma function
In practice, can we estimate the bias by replacing the expectation (over X ) with the mean
over the data, and g by the estimated gˆ.
Reparameterization The model in the previous section provides a formalization of con-
founding strength and tells us how much bias is induced by a given strength of confounding.
This lets us translate judgments about confounding strength to judgments about bias. For
this to be useful, we must be able to make plausibility judgments about confounding strength,
or, equivalently, the sensitivity parameters. To facilitate such judgments, we move to a more
convenient reparameterization of the model.
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Following Imbens [Imb03], we will re-express the outcome-confounder strength in terms of
the partial coefficient of determination:
R2Y,par(α,δ) =
E(Y −Q(T, X ))2 −E(Y −E[Y | T, X , U])2
E(Y −Q(T, X ))2 .
The advantages of this parameterization over δ are that R2Y,par has a familiar interpretation—
the proportion of previously unexplained variation in Y that is explained by the unobserved
covariate U—and that it has a fixed, unitless scale—enabling easy comparisons with refer-
ence values.
The reparameterization depends on the unobserved quantity E[Y | T, X , U]. To actually
compute the reparameterization, we establish the following result:
Theorem 2.4. Under our sensitivity model, Assumption 1, the outcome influence is
R2Y,par(α,δ) = δ
2
1∑
t=0
E

ψ1
 
g(X )t(1− g(X ))1−t(1/α− 1) + 1[T = t]
E[(Y −Q(T, X ))2] ,
where ψ1 is the trigamma function.
We defer the proof to the supplementary material.
Notice that, since R2Y,par ∈ [0,1), this expression restricts the possible values of δ. This
is a particular manifestation of the requirement that the distribution for the observed
data implied by the sensitivity model should match the actual distribution of the observed
data. An advantage of the R2Y,par-parameterization is that it enforces the δ restriction
automatically.
We do not re-parameterize the strength of confounding on treatment assignment because,
by design, α is already interpretable and on a fixed, unitless scale.
Estimating bias In combination, Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 yield an expression for the bias
in terms of α and R2Y,par. Namely, we rearrange Theorem 2.4 to solve for δ, and plug this
expression into Theorem 2.3. Note that because the partial R2 only depends on δ2, the sign
of the bias is ambiguous (i.e., we can only calculate the absolute value of the bias from α
and R2Y,par).
In practice, we can estimate the bias induced by confounding by fitting models for Qˆ and gˆ
and replacing the expectations by means over the data. To avoid problems associated with
overfitting, we recommend a data splitting approach. Namely, split the data into k folds
and, for each fold, estimate Q(t i , x i) and g(x i) by fitting the Qˆ and gˆ models on the other
k− 1 folds.
Average treatment effect on the treated The same logic provides an estimate for the bias
of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) under the sensitivity model. Namely,
the expectation over X in Theorem 2.3 is conditioned on T = 1. In practice, the bias can be
estimated by taking the mean over only treated units. Note that the re-parameterization
calculation does not change.
3 Calibration using observed data
The analyst must make judgments about the influence a hypothetical unobserved confounder
might have on treatment assignment and outcome. To calibrate such judgments, we’d like
to have a reference point for how much the observed covariates influence the treatment
assignment and outcome. In the sensitivity model, the degree of influence is measured by
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R2Y,par and α. We want to measure the degree of influence of an observed covariate Z given
the other observed covariates X\Z .
For the outcome, this can be measured as:
R2Y,X\Z :=
E(Y −E[Y | T, X\Z])2 −E(Y −Q(T, X ))2
E(Y −E[Y | T, X\Z])2 .
That is, the fraction of variation explained by Z not been previously explained by X\Z .
Computing this expression requires an estimate for E[Y | T, X\Z]. In practice, it is simplest
to estimate the quantity by fitting a new regression model that predicts Y from T and X\Z .
Calling the fitted model QˆX\Z , we estimate
Rˆ2Y,X\Z =
1
n
∑
(yi − QˆX\Z(t i , x i\zi))2 − 1n
∑
(yi − Qˆ(t i , x i))2
1
n
∑
(yi − QˆX\Z(t i , x i\zi))2 .
We now turn to the analogous estimate for the influence on treatment assignment. With
α in the form of (1.2), it is not obvious how to compute this quantity. Accordingly, we
re-express α in a more convenient form:
Theorem 3.1. Under our sensitivity model, Assumption 1,
α= 1− E[ g˜(X , U)(1− g˜(X , U))]E[g(X )(1− g(X ))] .
We defer the proof to the appendix.
Then, to measure the influence of observed covariate Z on treatment assignment given X\Z
we define gX\Z(X\Z) = P(T = 1 | X\Z) and
αX\Z := 1− E[g(1− g)]E[gX\Z(1− gX\Z)] .
We then estimate this quantity by fitting a model for gX\Z by predicting T from X\Z and
then estimating
αˆX\Z = 1−
1
n
∑
i gˆ(x i)(1− gˆ(x i))
1
n
∑
i gˆX\Z(x i\zi)(1− gˆX\Z(x i\zi))
.
Average treatment effect on the treated Reference values for the ATT can be computed in
exactly the same way—i.e., it is not required to restrict the expectations to only the treated
units. This is because the bias expression is given in terms of ‘full data’ α and R2Y,par.
Grouping covariates The estimated values αˆX\Z and Rˆ2Y,X\Z measure the influence of
Z conditioned on all the other confounders. In some cases, this can be misleading. For
example, if some piece of information is important but there are multiple covariates providing
redundant measurements, then the estimated influence of each covariate will be small.
To avoid this, we suggest grouping together related or strongly dependent covariates and
computing the influence of the entire group in aggregate. For example, grouping income,
location, and race together as ‘socioeconomic variables’.
4 Examples
We now examine several examples of Austen plots for sensitivity analysis, showing: (1) We
preserve the qualitative usefulness of Imbens’ approach, without any modeling restrictions.
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(2) Austen plots can aid judgments in the reliability of conclusions from real observa-
tional studies. (3) It matters what model is used for Q and g—so the ability to validly
handle arbitrary models is important. (4) The bias estimates from the model tend to be
conservative.2
Imbens’ analysis To demonstrate the use of Austen plots, we follow Imbens [Imb03] and
produce sensitivity plots for variations on the LaLonde job training data [LaL86]. We find
that our conclusions about the effects of unobserved confounding are substantively the same
as Imbens [Imb03]. That is, we arrive at sensible sensitivity conclusions while liberating
ourselves from the need for parametric assumptions on the observed data.
The original purpose of the LaLonde job training data was to analyze the effect of a job
training program on the annual earnings of a participant. The data consists of both an
experimental (randomly assigned) part, and an observational sample from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). Following Imbens [Imb03], we test on (1) the experimental
sample, (2) the experimental treated with observational controls, (3) the same as 2, except
with outcome defined as change in earnings since 1974, and (4) the same as 2, except
individuals with high-earnings pre-treatment are dropped. We adjust for the same covariate
set as Imbens: married, age, education, race, and earnings in 1974 and 1975. There are
large differences in these background covariates between the experimental sample and the
PSID controls—this is what makes causal inference from the combined experimental and
PSID samples challenging.
Deviating from Imbens, we fit random forests for Qˆ and gˆ. This demonstrates the sensitivity
analysis in the case where the observed data model does not have a simple parametric
specification. In particular, we split the data into 10 folds and predict Qˆ(x i , t i) and gˆ(x i)
for each unit in a given fold using random forests trained on the other folds.
Austen plots for these analyses are displayed in Figure 2. The experimental sample (panel A)
is robust to unobserved confounding: inducing a bias of $1000 would require an unobserved
confounder with a much stronger effect than any of the measured covariates or earning
variables. By contrast, the non-experimental samples (panels B and C) are much more
sensitive to unobserved confounding. Several of the covariates, if unobserved, would suffice
to bias the estimate by $1000. Note that the sensitivity curves are the same for both B and
C, since the outcome is just a linear transformation. Finally, the restricted sample (panel
D) is both significantly more robust to bias than the full non-experimental samples, and
the influence of the observed covariates is much reduced. Imposing the restriction makes
the experimental and non-experimental populations much more similar. Accordingly, we
might conclude that estimates in the restricted sample are less prone to bias in the sense
that it seems less likely that there is some unobserved confounder with sufficient influence
to meaningfully bias the result.
Practical relevance Figure 3 shows Austen plots for two effects estimated from observational
data. The first study is based on data from the Infant Health and Development Program
(IHDP) [BG+92], an experiment targeted at low-birth-weight, premature infants that
provided child care and home visits. The study here measures the effect on an IQ test of the
level of participation in IHDP child development centers in the two years preceding this test
[Hil11, §6.1]. Level of participation is not randomly assigned, so Hill [Hil11] estimates the
effect by using Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART) [Chi+10] to control for a range
of pre-treatment covariates.
The second plot corresponds to the estimate of the effect of combination blood pressure
medications on diastolic blood pressure described in [Dor+16]. The data is derived from
an American survey that includes a variety of socioeconomic and health factors. We again
use BART to adjust for these.
2Demonstration code is available at github.com/anishazaveri/austen_plots
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Figure 2: Austen plots preserve the qualitative conclusions of Imbens’ analysis without imposing any
restriction on the modeling of the observed data. In each plot, the black solid line indicates the partial
R2 and α values that would induce a bias of at least $1000. Each plot also includes estimates for the
strength of confounding for each of the nine covariates (red circles) as well as recent lag in earnings
(RE75 and pos75, yellow circles), and the all pre-program earnings (RE74, pos74, RE75, pos75, green
circles).
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Figure 3: Austen plots are informative when applied to real data analysis. The left-hand plot is for
the estimated effect of IHDP participation level on child IQ. The conclusions of this study seem robust
to unobserved confounding—even the observed covariate groups do not have sufficient influence
to undo the qualitative conclusion of the model. The right-hand plot is for the estimated effect of
combination treatment on diastolic blood pressure. In this case, whether the study conclusions are
reliable depends on whether an unobserved confounder as influential as age is credible—we should
consult with an expert. In both cases, we model the outcome with Bayesian Additive Regression Trees,
and the propensity score with logistic regression.
Table 1: The sensitivity model tends to be conservative in its bias estimates. Bias estimates for
leaving out a confounding covariate are computed according to the sensitivity model (using the left-out
covariate data) and by comparing non-parametric effect estimates from the full data (τx ), and the
left-out covariate data (τx\z). In all cases, the sensitivity model estimate is larger.
Study: LaLonde Restricted Blood Pressure IHDP
Omitted covariate: Education Age Socioeconomic
τx 2508.63 −2.33 12.72
τx\z 1982.54 −2.86 13.35
Nonparametric bias 526.09 0.53 −0.63
Sensitivity Model |bias| 986.90 1.91 0.75
The Austen plots are informative for these examples. In the first case, the Austen plot
increases our confidence in the qualitative result. In the second case, it suggests we should
be cautious about the conclusions unless unobserved confounders as strong as age are
deemed unlikely.
Model specification We might hope that fully parametric approaches are ‘good enough’
in the sense that they yield sensitivity analyses with conclusions that are substantially the
same irrespective of modeling details. Figure 4 shows this is not so. The conclusions of
the sensitivity analysis depend on the observed data model, so we require a sensitivity
model approach that can handle the model that best fits the observed data. Austen plots
accomplish this by allowing arbitrary models for the observed data.
Sensitivity model conservatism The bias curves and influence estimates in Austen plots
are contingent on the assumed sensitivity model, Assumption 1. Any sensitivity analysis
must be predicated on some assumption about the influence of the unobserved confounder.
We motivated our particular choice by simplicity and tractability. We also expect that
our associated sensitivity model will often yield conservative values for bias; i.e., the bias
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Figure 4: The qualitative conclusions of the sensitivity analysis depend on how the observed data is
modeled. All three Austen plots are for estimating the effect of combination medications on blood
pressure [Dor+16]. Both the sensitivity curves and the estimated influence of observed variables are
affected by the modeling choice. The leftmost panel uses linear regression and logistic regression for
the outcome and treatment models, respectively. The middle panel uses Bayesian Additive Regression
Trees and logistic regression. The rightmost panel uses Bayesian Additive Regression Trees and a
random forest predictor.
anticipated by the sensitivity model is higher than the true bias induced by the real, physical,
mechanism of confounding. The reason is that we assume monotonically increasing bias
in both treatment and outcome influence. In reality, hidden confounders can have more
complicated relationships that ‘cancel out’. For example, the effect of age in the blood
pressure example might be: blood pressure increases with age, but young patients don’t
take their medication (preferring diet and exercise), middle age patients take it at a base
rate, and old patients don’t take the medication (fatalism). In this case, the young people
cause the drug to look less effective (non-takers with low blood pressure), and old people
cause the drug to look more effective (non-takers with high blood pressure). These effects
cancel out somewhat, reducing the bias induced by failing to adjust for age. Assumption 1
does not allow for such cancellations.
To test conservatism, we create deliberately confounded datasets by removing an ob-
served confounder from our baseline data. We compute the bias anticipated by our model,
bias(R2Y,X\Z ,αX\Z), using the measured influence strength of the covariate. We compute a
non-parametric estimate of the bias by estimating the effect with the full data, estimating
the effect with the deliberately confounded data, and taking the difference. The results are
shown in table 1, and confirm the conservatism-in-practice. This increases our confidence
that when an Austen plot suggests robustness to unobserved confounding we do indeed
have such robustness.
5 Related Work
There are a wealth of approaches to sensitivity analysis. Informally, these divide into
latent-confounder approaches in the style of Imbens’, which are relatively easy to interpret,
and alternative approaches that make weaker assumptions at the price of interpretability.
Austen plots have the advantage that they preserve the key elements of the latent-confounder
approach while also allowing arbitrary data modeling approaches. However, the assumptions
and subjective judgments required for each analysis are quite different, and alternative
approaches may be easier in some scenarios. In this sense, the zoo of sensitivity analysis
methods are complimentary to each other and to the Austen plot approach.
The most closely related approaches to ours are sensitivity analysis based on parametric
models in the style of Imbens [Imb03]. These typically assume some relatively simple
parametric latent variable model, where the latent variable is the unobserved confounder,
while also relaxing Imbens’ fully-specified approach. Dorie et al. [Dor+16] extends an
Imbens-like approach to accommodate BART as the outcome model by embedding model
fitting in a (computationally intensive) simulation scheme. Zhang and Tchetgen Tchetgen
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[ZT19] allow the outcome to be modeled by a generalized linear model, and also remove
any assumption about the distribution of the unobserved confounder. Cinelli and Hazlett
[CH20] allow for arbitrary kinds of confounders and propensity score models, but require
that the outcome is modeled with linear regression. Cinelli et al. [Cin+19] make concrete
assumptions about the edges of a causal DAG and use causal identification tools to translate
those assumptions into effect (hence, bias) estimates. However, they assume that all
relationships in the DAG are linear. Rosenbaum and Rubin [RR83a] assume a categorical
covariate and a binary confounder. They don’t impose any explicit additional constraints on
the propensity score or outcome model, but their general approach requires 4 sensitivity
parameters for each level of the observed covariate; making the sensitivity analysis practical
requires further assumptions.
A different line of work relaxes parametric assumptions at the price of requiring the analyst
to make judgments about more abstract sensitivity parameters. For example, Franks et al.
[Fra+19] assume logit P(T | X , Y (t)) = αt(X ) + γt Y (t), where Y (t) are potential outcomes,
and require the analyst to specify the sensitivity parameters γ0,γ1. That is, the analyst
needs to assess the strength of the relationship between each of the potential outcomes
and the treatment assignment. Shen et al. [She+11] present a method based on inverse
propensity weighted estimators that is largely free of parametric assumptions. In their
case, the sensitivity parameters are var g˜/g and the correlation between g˜/g and the
counterfactual outcomes. VanderWeele and Arah [VA11] derive very general bias formulas
under the assumption of categorical covariates and categorical confounder. Their general
analysis uses 4 sensitivity parameters per covariate level. They also offer a simplified version
under stronger assumptions, where, in particular, a sensitivity parameter is the difference
P(U = 1 | T = 1, x)− P(U = 1 | T = 0, x)—i.e., the analyst must make a judgment on the
confounder-treatment strength in the anti-causal direction. Ding and VanderWeele [DV15]
bound bias in estimate of the relative risk for a binary outcome allowing for a categorical
confounder. The main strength of their approach is that the bound is essentially non-
parametric. However, their treatment-confounder sensitivity parameter is the relative risk
of the unobserved confounding given treatment, which is again in the anti-causal direction.
In a different direction, Bonvini and Kennedy [BK19] propose a sensitivity model where
most units are presumed to be unconfounded, but a portion may be arbitrarily confounded.
The proportion of confounded units serves as the sensitivity parameter. Depending on the
application, the subjective judgments required by these models may be harder or easier to
assess than the confounding strength judgment required for Austen plots.
Another line of work assumes a model for the propensity score that’s logit-linear in an
unobserved confounder U ∈R [−1,1], assumes an a priori bound on the coefficient of U ,
and derives the range of treatment effects consistent with this bound [e.g., Ros10; Zha+19;
Yad+18]. See Yadlowsky et al. [Yad+18] for a particularly clear exposition. This approach
has the advantage that it can avoid any parametric assumptions on the observed data, and
avoid any modeling assumption relating U and Y . However, interpretation can be difficult
relative to the parametric-model approaches; in particular, choosing the a priori bound can
be challenging.
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A Proofs
Theorem 2.4. Under our sensitivity model, Assumption 1, the outcome influence is
R2Y,par(α,δ) = δ
2
1∑
t=0
E

ψ1
 
g(X )t(1− g(X ))1−t(1/α− 1) + 1[T = t]
E[(Y −Q(T, X ))2] ,
where ψ1 is the trigamma function.
Proof. First, we write:
E(Y −E[Y | T, X , U])2 = E(Y −Q(T, X ))2
− 2δE[(Y −Q(T, X ))(logit g˜(X , U)−E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T])]
+δ2E((logit g˜(X , U)−E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T]))2
= E(Y −Q(T, X ))2 −δ2E[var(logit g˜(X , U) | X , T )]. (A.1)
Where we’ve used,
E[(Y −Q(T, X ))(logit g˜(X , U)−E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T])]
= E[E[(Y −Q(T, X )) | T, X , U](logit g˜(X , U)−E[logit g˜(X , U) | X , T])]]
and other standard conditional expectation manipulations.
The usefulness of (A.1) is that var(logit g˜(X , U) | X , T ) has an analytic expression. Namely,
by Beta-Bernoulli conjugacy, this is the variance of a logit-transformed Beta distribution.
The analytic expression for this variance is,
var(logit g˜(X , U) | X , T ) =ψ1
 
g(X )(1/α− 1) + T+ψ1 (1− g(X ))(1/α− 1) + 1− T,
whereψ1 is the trigamma function. The claimed result follows by plugging in this expression
into (A.1).
Theorem 3.1. Under our sensitivity model, Assumption 1,
α= 1− E[ g˜(X , U)(1− g˜(X , U))]E[g(X )(1− g(X ))] .
Proof. The key insight is:
var( g˜) = E[var( g˜ | g)] + var(E[ g˜ | g])
= E[αg(1− g)] + var(g),
where the first line is the law of total variance, and the second line uses the assumed Beta
distribution of g˜ | g. Accordingly,
α=
var( g˜)− var(g)
E[g(1− g)] .
Now, observe that by the law of total variance,
var(T ) = E[var(T | g)] + var(E[T | g])
= E[g(1− g)] + var(g),
where we have used that T | g is Bernoulli. By the same logic,
var(T ) = E[ g˜(1− g˜)] + var( g˜).
Whence,
var( g˜)− var(g) = E[g(1− g)]−E[ g˜(1− g˜)].
The result follows immediately.
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